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III. Indemnities for becoming guarantor or bailsman.
In regard to this troublesome question it may be said first that:
an agreement to save one harmless for entering into an ordinary-
guaranty is, as a rule, within the Statute of Frauds. If A. says
to B., become surety for 0. to D., here if D. recovers from B. the-
first person who ought to reimburse and from whom if he assents-
to B.'s becoming surety, the ultimate exoneration should come is 0.,
so that A.'s promise is to pay B. if 0. does not, and is.therefore
within the statute. See the opinion of Lord DENMAN in Green.
v. Cresswell, 10-A. & E. 453' Chapin v. Merrill, 4 Wend. 657,.
which held a contrary doctrine, has been overruled in Baker v.
Dillman, 12 Abb. Prac. 316. In Lucas v. Chamberlain, 8 B..
Mon. 276, although the unqualified language of the opinion of'
the court would perhaps endorse Chapin v. Merrill, the facts of'
the case support the decision on another ground. C., the person,
answered for, was really a mere instrument of the promissee's, so
that the promissor guaranteed the promissee's owrk debt, thus
coming substantially witbin the line of decision headed by Thomas.
v. Cook, 8 B. & 0. 728, and.Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 A. & E. 438,
t9 the eff ct that a promise made to a debtor to answeer for a debt
for which he-himself is liable is not within the Statute of Frauds.
In a dictum in Mallory v. Gillett, 21 N. Y. 412, an indemnity
for an ordinhry guaranty is classed among those without the stat -
ute. Perley v. Spring, 12 Mass. 297 (partially overruled ih Cii-
hill v. Bigelow, 18 Pick. 371), has language to, the same effect as-
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Chapin v. Merrill, but in fact the promissor was put in funds out
of which to answer his indemnity, which of itself (vide supra
598-9) would take the case out of the statute. This was a case
too of civil bail, as to which something will be said hereafter.
Besides Baker v. Dillman we have cases as follows denying the
ruling of* Chapin v. Herrill: Brown v. Adams, 1 Stew. 51;
Staats v. Rowlett, 4 Denio 559; Kingsley v. Balcome, 4 Barb.
181; Drangham v. Bunting, 9 Ired. 10; Easter v. White, 12
Ohio 219. The authorities usually cited to support the principle
of Chapin v. Merrill will be found to resolve themselves into cases
where the party promising to indemnify was either co-principal
with the person whose debt the plaintiff guaranteed, as in Batson
t. King, 4 Hurlst. & N. 176; or was substantially himself the prin-
cipal, as in Doane v. Newman, 10 Mo. 69; Lucas v. Chamberlain,
8 B. Mon. 276, Garnier v. Hudgins, 46 Mo. 399 (a case rather
resembling Batson v. King); Reynolde v. Doyle, 1 M. & G. 753,
and Smith v. Sayward, 5 Greenl. 504; or was already surety
for the principal and procured the promissee to become his co-
surety, as in Jrones v. Letcher, 18 B. Mon. 864; Barry v. Ban-
.som, 12 N. Y. 462; Jones v. Shorter, 1 Kelly (Geo.) 294;
Thomas v. Cook, 8 B. & C. 728; Harrison v. Sawtel, 10 Johnis.
242 (it is stated that the promissor in this case was already liable
for the third party as to whom the promissee became guarantor,
but it does not appear how); Blake v. Cole, 22 Pick. 97 (A. sued
B. his co-surety for contribution; B. set up a parol indemnity;
the Statute of Frauds held not to apply), and Taylor v. Savage,
12 Mass. 102; oi rhere, as in Peck v. Thompson, 15 Vt. 637,
A., who had paid B. with an order on C.- -which C. honored on
-the stipulation that B. should hold himself accountable for repay-
'ment, says to B. endure a suit from 0., and if it is found that C.
owed you nothing on tdy order (having owed me. nothing), that the
payment was a voluntary one of his own money and you are
obliged to refund the amount, I will not consider that order as
a payment of my d~bt to you, but will pay you afresh and com-
.pensate you for the costs and expenses of the suit; or where, as
-in Tarr v. Northey, 17 Me. 113, A., who -was not the execution-
-creditor, told B. the sheriff, to levy on certain property and pro-
,mised to indemnify him; cases where the promise was not to
-answer for the debt, default, &c., of a third person, but for that of
-the promissee himself. In Peck v. Thompson the promissee should
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have paid C. without a suit; in Tarr v. Northey if he should levy
on the wrong property, he would have been guilty of a default.
Adams v. Dansy, 6 Bingh. 506 (19 E. C. L.. 149), is a case
similar to these two last. Peck v. Thompson may also be con-
sidered as a case of conditional payment; A. who owes B. pays
him by a debt which C. owes him, A., and promises if C. does
not pay, he, A., will; a contract clearly without the statute.
Or lastly, the cases will be found-to be where the promissee's lia-
bility is substituted for the promissor's, as in Hasinger v. ,Solmes,
5 S. & R. 9. A. says to B., take my place as surety for C. to
D. and I will save you harmless. In Beaman v. Russell, 20 Vt.
205, A. promised to indemnify B. for becoming one of the makers
of a promissory note. The court held that as it did not appear
that ahy one but A. was liable to reimburse B., the coptract was
not collateral. In Chapin v. Lap/am, 20 Pick. 467, A. promised
to indemnify B. for becoming surety for C. C. was a minor in
whom there was no liability, the engagement therefore was not col-
lateral.
The present state of the English law as to the application of the
Statute of Frauds to indemnities for becoming bail, is thus given
by Mr. Leake in his work on Contracts, p. 129: "An indemnity
given to a person for becoming bail for the appearance of another
on a criminal charge is not within the statute, because there is no
debt or duty owing from the person bailed to the person who be-
comes bail. (Crippsv. Hartnoll, 2 B. & S. 697; 4 Id., 414; 31
L. J. Q. B. 150 ; 32 Id. 381): But an indemnity given to a sure-
.ty in a bail-bond in a civil action was held to constitute a promise
within the statute to answer for the default of the principal debtor;
which decision it seems is to .be supported, if at all, on the ground
that in civil proceedings there is a legal duty in the person bailed
towards his bail to keep him harmless by surrendering or paying
the debt (Green v. Cresswell, 10 A. & E. 453; and see Cripps v.
Jiartnoll, supra; Reader v. Xin~gham, 13 C. B. N. S. 344, 355;
32 L. J. C. P. 108, 110)." Reader v. Kingham, as given by Mr.
Leake, is as follows: "The plaintiff, the bailiff of a county court,
having ariested a person for the non-payment of a judgment-debt,
released him upon the promise of the defendant to pay the plain-
tiff the amount on a certain day or surrender the debtor; it was
held that the promise was not within the statute because the debt
answered for was not owing to the promissee." Aldrich v. Ames8,
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9 Gray 76, a promise to indemnify one for becoming bail held not
to be within the statute; the case seems to have beeni rested on the
pri'nciple of Thomas v. Cooke, and Eaatwood v. Kenyon, supra
721. The bail seems to have been in a civil action. Holme8 v.
Knijht, 10 N. IL 175 supports Reader v. Kiny/ham; contrd
Kingsley v. Balcolme, 4 Barb. 131.
IV. Whether an agreement which can be performed on one side
within a year but not on the other, is within that section of the
8tatute which provides that "No action shall be brought * * * upon
any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one
year from the making thereof."
Mr. Leake, in his work on Contracts, p. 136-7, says: "The stat-
ute includes only those contracts which cannot be performed within
a year on either side, contracts which may be performed within
the year on one side, though they cannot be performed within the
year on the other side, are not within the statute; thus a contract
for the sale of goods to be delivered in six months, and to be paid
for in eighteen months, would not be within the statute (per
ABBOTT, J., Bracegirdle v. Hleald, 1 B. & Ald. 722, 727; per
PARKE, J., Donellan v. Read, 3 B. & Ad. 899, 903). A con-
tract for the sale and assignment of a patent, to be paid for by
payments at periods extending beyond a year, is not within the
statute, because it is capable of being performed by the seller within
the year: Cheny v. .eming, 4 Ex. 631; Smith v. .Neale, 2 C.
B. N. S. 67; 26 L. J. C. P. 143. So a contract between a land-
lord and tenant for the landlord to lay out 501. in improverhent of
the premises, no time being given for so doing, and the tenant to
pay 51. a year increased rent during the remainder of the term,
was held not within the statute: Donellan v. Read, 3 B. & Ad.
899; and see Hoby v. Roebuck, 7 Taunt. 157." See the American
cases of Gee v. Hicks, Rich. Eq. 5 ; Johnson v. Watson, 1 Geo.
348; Talmadge v. R. B., 18 Barb. 493 1 Holbrook v. Armstrong,
10 Me. (1 Fair f.) 81; Rake v. Pope, 7 Ala. 161; Bates v. Moore,
2 Bailey 614; Houghton v. Houghton, 14 Ind. 505. Where one
party has it in his power to perform his part of a contract and to
exact compensation from the other within a year the Statute of
Frauds does not apply, though the performance of the contract
might not happen till after a year: Plimpton v. Curtis, 15"Wend.
336. The doatrine of JDonellan v. Read has been vigorously corn-
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 725
batted in some of the United States, and not without a show of
reason when the literal wording of the statute is considered. See
Browne on Stat. of Fr., § 286 et seq., for a clear treatment of this
point. In Sheely v. Adarene, 8 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 326, per
BARRETT, J. (with a note by Judge REDFIELD), the syllabus is as
follows : "Where a verbal contract is to be performed within a year
by one party but not by the other, the question whether the Stat-
ute of Frauds applies or not depends on whether the suit is brought
against the party who was to have performed his part within the*
year. If it is'so brought the statute would not apply, but if brought
against the party whose agreement was not to be performed within
the year then the statute would be a defence." This apparently un-
equal rule is not, it is believed, supported by any other American
authority, and though a number, as we shall see, are in harmony
with it so far as it denies Donellan v. Bead, none involve a doc-
trine which so seriously infringes the ordinary principle of mu-
tuality of remedy. In Pierce v. Paine, 28 Vt. 34, REDFIELD,
C. J., says "that if the work done by A., whose performance is to
be infra annum, is accepted by B., whose performance is to be
extra annum, the rule should be, not as laid down in Souch v.
Strawbridge, 2 C. B. 808, viz.: that the contract is taken out of
the statute, but that an action for recovery of his damages should
lie by A." It is submitted, however, that if the doctrine of
Donellan v. Bead be denied, then it would follow that such an
action for damages should be allowed each party, but that neither
should be held to an exact performance of the contract. See
Emery v. Smith, 46 N. H. 151, to the same effect as Pierce v.
Paine, with an elaborate discussion of the cases. A promise to
pay in three years for lands presently conveyed, held to be within
the Statute of Frauds: Marcy v. Marcy, 9 Allen 8, denying the
English rule and claiming the law of Vermont and New York to
be the other way. In Broadwell v. Getman, 2 Denio 87, BEARDS-
LEY, J., laid down the rule afterwards developed in Sheely v.
Adarene. He said that a quantum meruit lay but not a recovery
on the contract. The actual contract was, it would seem, inca-
pable on both sides of performance within a year, or rather it
appears to have been the intention of the parties that nothing
should be done within that time. As to Broadwell v. Getman,
see Wilson v. Bay, 13 Ind. 1. Pitkin v. Long Island B. B., 2
Barb. Ch. 221, and Quackenbush v. BEhle, 5 Barb. N. Y. 469, ap-
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parently involve the doctrine of Broadwell v.'Getman. A. hired
certain negroes to B., to be delivered at once and to be paid for
twenty months-from date; in an action for the price, the Statute of
Frauds held to be a good defence: Davenport v. Gentry, 9 B.
Mon. 427. Tuttle v. Swett, 31 Me. 555, is not an authority
lagainst Donellan v. Bead, the contract in question coul not be
performed on either side, infra annum. A person received a con-
veyance of land, in consideration of which he promised to pay off
an incumbrance thereon, maturing extra annum. Held, that as the
contract was completely executed on one side by the delivery of
the deed and nothing remained but the payment of the money, the
Statute of Frauds did not apply: Curtis v. Sage, 35 Ill. 37, dis-
tinguishing Artcher v. Zeh, 5 Hill 200, and sustaining Donellan v.
Bead, the cases cited against the latter bieing considered. A
vendor's lien for purchase-money to be paid more than a year
from the date of conveyance, held notito be affected by the Stat.
of Frauds, one side of the contract being infra annum: Baugh v.
Blythe, 20 Ind. 24. See to the same general effect Compton v.
Martin, 5 Rich. (So. Car.) 14, and'Miller v. Bobertef, 18 Tex. 19.
V. As to what contracts 6* the ome iuard are for the tale of
by goods, wares, and merchandise, for the price. of," c., and
iithin the statute ; as to what eontracti "on the other are for work
and labor and without the statute
A passage from Leake may perhaps be the best.opening for this
discussion also. " Contracts for work and labor, sayo Mr. Leake
(Elements of the Law of Contracts, p. 188-9y, "though expended
In making goods for the emplbyer are not contracts for the sale
6f goods within'the statute. 'Thus a contract with a person to
tnake afti article" with the materials of the employer is a contract
for work and labor and not within the statute: (per BAYLEY, J., At-
kinson v. Bell, 8 13. & 0. 277, 283). A contract with a person tO
work up his own materials in making an article and to deliver it,
may be a contract for work and labor, and the materiajs incident
to the employment or a contract for the sale of goods according to
the circumstances: (Atkinson v. Bell, and see Lee v. Griffin, 1 B.
& S. 272; 30 L. J. Q. B. 252). Thus a contract with an attorney
to prepare a deed: see per ERLE, J., Grafton v. Armitage, 2 C. B.
836, and per BLACKBURN, J., Lee v. Griffin), a contract for con-
triving a machine for a certain purpose (Grafton v. Armitage), a con
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tract with a printer to print a book (Clay v. Yates, 1 H. & N. 73;
25 L. J. Ex. 237), are contracts for work, labor and materials, and
not for the sale of goods and not within the statute. A contract
for the manufacture of a machine (Atkinson v. Bell, and Grrafton
v. Armitage), a contract with a tailor or shoemaker for the making
of articles of their trade (per COLTMAN, J., Grafton v. Armitage),
a contract with a miller for a quantity of flour which he bad to
grind (Garbutt v. Watson, 5 B. & Aid. 613, and see Wilks v. At-
kinson, 6 Taunt. 11 ; lBondeau v. Wyatt, 2 R. Bl. 63, 67), a con-
tract to make a set of artificial teeth to fit the mouth of the
purchaser (Lee v. Griffin), a contract with an artist for work of
art (Lee v. Griffin, but see per POLLOCK, C. B., Clay v. Yates, 1
H. & N. 73, 78; 25 L. J. Ex. 237, 239), are not contracts for
work and libor, but for the sale of goods when completed. A con-
tract for the sale of goods at a certain price, including the carriage
and delivery of them at a certain place, is within the statute (Astey
v. Emery, 4 M. & S. 262). Where a carrier was employed by a
purchaser of goods to buy them for him and to carry and deliver
them, the contract was held not to be within the statute (Cobbold
v. Caston, 1 Bing. 399)."
. "Lord Tenterden's Act, 4 Geo. IV., c. 14 s. 7, after reciting
this section (17th section of' the Statute of Frauds relating to
contracts for the sale of goods) of the statute, and that it had
been held that it did not extend to certain executory contracts
for the sale of goods which were nevertheless within the mischief
thereby intended to be remedied, and that it was expedient to
extend it to such executory contracts, enacted that the said en-
actment shall extend to all contracts for the sale of goods of
the value of ten pounds sterling and upwards, notwithstanding
the goods may be intended to be delivered at some future time or
may not at the time of such contract be actually made, procured
or provided or fit or ready for delivery or somb act may be re-
quisite for the making or completing thereof or rendering the same
fit for delivery." "(Ledake, p. 137.) "As to contracts of this
kind before Lord Tenterden's Act, see Towers v. Osborne, 1 Str.
506; Mucktow v. Mangles, 1 Taunt. 318; Buxton v. Bedal, 3
East 303, seeming to hold them not within the statute; and Cooper
v. Elston, 7 T. R. 14; Wilks v. Atkinson, 6 Taunt. 11 ; Gar-
butt v. Wa'son, 5 B. & Ald. 613; Smith v. Surman, 9 B. & C.
561, holding the contrary." (Leake p. 137, n. f.)
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This act has been considered in Wisconsin and Georgia, as de-
claratory of the previous law: ifordell v. Mclure, 1 Chand.
(Wis.) 271; Cason v. Cheely, 6 Geo. 554. In New York the
expediency of having such a statute was strongly urged in _obertson
v. Vaughn, 5 Sandf. 1 ; reluctantly following Sewall v. .Fitch, as
to which vide infra 733. As to how far Towers v. Osborne, &c., and
how far Cooper v. Elston, &c., are law in this country, vide infra.
The American authorities on the vexed question which is now
before us may be said to be contained in the following summary.
"If the contract be substantially for the goods, it is within the statute
whether they are then manufactured or not, but it is otherwise if
the labor and skill.of the seller is stipulated for and makes part
of the contract": Pitkin v. Noyes, 48 N. H. 294, in which will be
found an extended review of the cases. The following contract3
have been held to be within the Statute of Frauds r A contract
for the delivery of a quantity of planks for ship-building at a future
time, and at a specified price. (There is no evidence that there
was any work to be done upon the timber): Waterman v. Heis,
4 Cush. 499. A contract to cut growing timber and deliver it;
-Edwards v. B. B., 54 Me. 105, citing Garbutt v. Watson, and
Waterman v. Ieigs. A contract for the sale and delivery of 'a
quantity of wood then in standing trees: Smith v. B. B., 4 Keyes
180. A contract to sell certain articles---so many boxes at so
much per pound, to be manufactured by the vendor: Gardner v.
Joy, 8 Mete. 179, distinguishing Spencer v. Cone, and Mier v.
Howarth, as to which vide infra 732. A contract for boards at so
much per foot board measure, to be sawed from logs at the plaintiff's
expense but under the defendant's direction : Gorham v. Fisher,
30 Vt. 428. A contract for a certain number of spokes to be madb
and delivered: Prescott v. Locke, 51 N. H. 94. A contract to
cut down certain trees, cut them enough to make them transporta-
ble, and deliver them at the defendant's mill, to be paid for at so
much per cord: the work and labor to be bestowed having no
effect to change the character of the goods delivered, but being
only enough to fit them for transportation, it was said that they
must be considered as substantially unaltered when delivered: .Elli-
son v. Briqham, 38 Vt. 66, relying on Smith v. Surman, 9 B. & C
561, and denying Clayton v. Andrews, as being founded on tha doe
trine since overthrown, to the effect that executory contracts ar.
without the statute: see the arguments of counsel iL Ellise v.-
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Brigham, for a full collection of authorities. A contract to deliver
certain sewing-machines not then finished to the plaintiff, the
machines to be completed by a third person who worked for the
defendant, the contract between the two latter being that the defend-
ant was to provide a shop and its fittings, and the third person was to
make the machines to be paid for atso much each: Atwater v. Hough,
29 Conn. 508. A contract on the plaintiff's part to procure cider from
the farmers, refine it, and deliver'it to the defendant: Seymour v.
Davis, 2 Sandf. 239 (relying on Downs v. Ross, (vide infra), and
Garbutt v. Watson). A contract for the manufacture of a cotton-
gin made under a general order: Winship v. Buzzard, 9 Rich. 105.
A contract for so many bushels of wheat, the actual wheat being at
the time of the contract made still unthrashed : Hordell v. Me-
Ulure, 1 Chand. 271. A contract for the sale of wool-pelts, to be
taken off during a certain season: Gilman v. Hill, 36 N. H.
311." A contract to deliver a certain number of barrels of flour,
to be ground out of wheat which has been, bargained for by the
promissor but not yet received: Brononv. Wiman, 10 Barb. 406.
(In Ide v. Stanton, 15 Vt. 689, Garbutt v. Wat8on was referred
to, but the contract in question, which was for the sale of wool, some
of which the party had and the rest of which he expected to pro-
cure, was, without relying on that authority, clearly within the
Statute of Frauds.) A contract for the sale and delivery of cotton
growing: Cason v. (01 eely, 6 Geo. 554, approving Bird v. Muh-
linbrin, (infra 731), Garbutt v. Watson, and Watts v. Friend, 10
B. & C. 440, and saying that a contract for goods, not yet in ease
but easily procurable, and if rejected by the party, for whom they
were made or procured, readily saleable, should be within the stat-
ute. A contract to clean some thrashed wheat, and to thrash
other wheat still in straw, and to deliver a certain number of
bushels; Downs v. Boss, 23 Wend. 270, per BRONSo, J., (NELSON,
J., concurring, and Cown., J., dissenting), Judge BRONSON, after
saying how much it had cost to explain the Statute of Frauds (a
million or so of pounds sterling), 4ent on to remark that it never
would be explained "so long as if is-held that a promise by a seller to
thrash his grain or to blow the chaff out of a bin of wheat before
sending it to market, changes a contract of sale into an agreement
for work and labor." He further remarked, citing Astey v. Emery,
4 M. & S. 262, that the fact that goods are to be delivered at an-
other placy than that where they are at the time of the contract,
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so as to enhance the price which the party setting up the statute
is to receive, will not help the other party. All the cases cited,
said the learned judge, holding contracts of this kind to be without
the statute are those where something Inot yet in existence, is to be
manufactured by the vendor (mentioning among the rest Mixer v.
ltowarth, vide infra 732).
In Jackson v. Covert, 5 Wend. 136, following Bennett v. Hull,
10 Johns. 364 (holding a contract to deliver 100 barrels of apples
to be within the statute : whether the apples were in esse or not
at the time of the contract made does not appear), and distin-
guishing Crookshanic v. Burrell (vide infra 749), and Sewall v.
Fitch (vide infra 733), a contract for the future delivery of wheat
upon which no labor was to be bestowed, was held to be within the
Statute of Frauds. But see Webster v. Kelly, infra 733, and
Bichelberger v. McCauley, infra 734.. A contract to sell and deliver
at a fixed price per quantity, all the broom-corn on a certain tract
of land, was held to be within the Statute of Frauds in Bowman
v. Conn, 8 Inc. 58, relying on Watts v. Friend, 10 B. & C. 446,
and distinguishing the case of work to be done upon a future crop
from the skill bestowed upon the manufacture of a wagon for
example.. A contract by a tallow-chandler to furnish one with
refined tallow, held to be within the Statute of Frauds in .Lamb v.
Crafts, 12 Mete. 356, SHAW, C. J., saying that "when a person
stipulates for the future sale of articles which he is habitually
making, and which at the time are not made or finished, it is es-
sentially a contract of sale and not a contract forlabor; otherwise
where the article is made pursuant to the agreement." In Hight
v. Bipley, 19 Me. 149, the difference between a contract for
sale and one for labor said to consist in this, that "the person
ordering the article to be made is under no obligation to receive as
good or even a better one of the like kind purchased from another
for him. It is the peculiar skill and labor of the other party com-
bined with the materials for which he (the purchaser) con-
'tracted, and to which he is entitled." Hence, a contract to make
hoes according to a pattern left by the purchaser, was held not to
be within the statute. A contract for an article not in esse and
to be made according to order by the party not in the line of his
general business, was held in Jinney v. Apgar, 2 Vroom 226, to
be for work and materials and without the statute. So a contract
by a mechanic to furnish materials and do carpenter work, &c.,
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according to a specific plan for buildings to be erected upon the
land of the other party: Courtright v. Stewart, 19 Barb. 455;
considering the early cases and following Garbutt v. Watson;
said Judge HARRIS, who delivered the opinion of the court: " In
Mixer v. -Howarth (vide infra 732), SIIAw, C. J., said: ' When
the contract is a contract of sale, either of articles then existing
or of articles which the vendor has usually for sale in the course
of his business, the statute applies to the contract as well when it
is to be executed at a future time as when it is to be executed
immediately. But where it is an agreement with a workman
to put materials together and construct an article for the em-
ployer, whether at an agreed price or not, though in common it
may be called a purchase and sale of the article to be completed
in future; it is not a sale until an actual or constructive delivery
and acceptance.' A still more accurate criterion," adds HARRIS,
J., " is to inquire whether the work and labor required in order
to prepare the subject-matter of the contract, for delivery is to be
done for the vendor himself or for the vendee. In the former
case the contract is really a contract of sale, while on the latter
it is a contract of hiring," and goes on to say that tried by this
test Sewell v. Pitch (infra 783) is questionable. In Bird v. Huh-
lUnbrink, 1 Rich. 202, the learned judge who delivered the opinion
of the court, thought that the contract should only be taken out
of the Statute of Frauds when labor is primarily contemplated,
done for the purchaser so as to make this the essential part of the
'contract, as a picture for example, directed to be painted which no
one else perhaps would buy: Sewall v. Fitch (vide infra 733),
thought to go too far. In an action for mnaking certain surgical.
instruments, evidence that the parts of the instruments were pro-
cured, each finished, and that the defendants' labor was merely
putting them together, was held to be no variance: held also, that
the contract was not within the Staiute of Frauds : Allen v.
Jarvis, 20 Conn. 38, considering Atkinson v. Bell. So a con-
tract to make bricks for B. and to deliver them at a certain price,
B. to select the spot and the clay for the manufacture, the statute
was held not to apply: O'Neil v. The Mining Co., 9 Nev. 141.
See Parker v. Schenck, 28 Barb. 38, for an example of a con-
tract, held to be without the statute as being for work done under
L special order. In JHead v. Case, 33 Barb. 202, a contract that
&. monument, the pieces of which were standing in the plaintiff's
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yard, should by him be polished, put together and lettered, was
held to be not within the statute, SMITH, J., dissenting: Sewall v.
Fitch. (vide infra 733), and Crook8hank v. Burrell (vide infra 733),
relied on. JoiaNsoN, J., in delivering the opinion of the court,
said, that in the case in question the work of finishing the monu-
ment involved additional skill different from that which had been
bestowed on preparing the parts and of a higher character. The
case of Mixer v. Howarth, 21 Pick. 207, which may be considered
the leading one in this country, and which, Chief Justice SHAW,
who gave the opinion of the court, always defended in his later
and more precise rulings, is not altogether satisfactory on its own
facts. The contract declared on was to make for and deliver to
the defendant a particular carriage. The evidence was that the
defendant chose out this one from a number standing in the plain-
tiff's shop, and indicated a certain stuff with which he wished it
lined, a lining being all that was necessary to complete it, while
the plaintiff on his part agreed so to line the carriage and to
deliver it to the defendant. The contract was in the course of the
plaintiff's ordinary business, and except the lining was merely for
the purchase of a chattel. The lining was chosen by the defend-
ant, it is true, but was not as far as we can see to be put in after
any special fashion. A carriage with that lining might not 'have
been saleable to any other person than the defendant, but such a
possibility seems a slight foundation for the theory of a contract
for work and labor.
Spencer v. Cone, 12 Mete. 283, follows Mixer v. fowarth, but
how far the contract in question was or was not within the scope
.of the party's ordinary business does not appear. A contract to
obtain the material for and to prepare certain houses known as the
"Fitzgerald patent portable houses," of certain specified dimen-
sions and to be delivered at a specified time and for a specified
price, held not to be within the Statute of Frauds, inasmuch as
the sale of the material was so blended with an agreement for
work, labor and materials as to take the whole agreement out of
the statute: Phipps v.- .fcFarlan, 3 Minn. 100, distinguishing
Downs v. Ross, ante 729, and saying that Judge HARRIS'S test given
in Courtright v. Stewart was of no great practical value, and that
Judge LITTLEDALE's remark in Thompson v. Maccaroni, 9 B. &
C. 561, to the following effect, viz., "it appears to me to be suffi-
cient if at the time of completion of the contract the subject-matter
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be goods, wares and merchandise," was contrary to American law.
In iifatthison v. Westcott, 13 Vt. 261, a contract to procure the
materials and make two gravestones, was held not to be within the
Statute of Frauds. Whether making gravestones was the p'irty's
ordinary business, and whether they were or not to be made under
a special order, does not appear: the two overruled cases of An-
drews v. layton, 4 Burr. 2101, and Towers v. Osborne, 1 Str.
506, were relied on.
The New York decisions upon the question before us are almost
consistently opposed to the* great weight of authority, and have
not been considered as satisfactory even by the New York courts
themselves.
In Urookshank v. Burrel, 18 Johns. 58, a contract to make
and deliver the wood-work of a wagon was held not to be within
the Statute of Frauds. It does not appear, however, but that
the contract was under a general order and in the line of the per-
son's ordinary business. Sewall v. Fitch, 8 Cow. 215 (reluctantly
followed in Robertson v. VFaughan, 5 Sandf. 1), is the most con-
spicuous authority on this point in New York, and though, as we
have seen, much disapproved of, has until recently been considered
settled law. It decided that a contract for nails to be manufactured
apparently under a general order of the plaintiff's, and in the or-
dinary business of the defendant, was not within the'Statute of
Frauds. A contract to make a certain number of. barrels of beer
was held in Donovan v. Wilson, 26 Barb. 138, following Sewall
.v. Fitch, not tobe within the statute. A contract for the manufac-
ture of ten tons of paper by the plaintiff in the usual course of his
business, to-be of the kind and quality as other paper previously
ordered by the defendant, and to be delivered at a place designated,
was held not to be within the Statute of Frauds: Parsons v. Lower,
4 Roberts. (N. Y.) 216, distinguishing Downs v. Ross and Seymour
v. Davis, following Sewall v. Fitch and GJrooklhank v. Burrell, and
admitting that Gardner v. Joy and Lamb v. Crafts (Mass. cases)
favored a- different view. In Webster v. Kelly, 52 Barb. 482, a
contract to-purchase and deliver at a future time hop-roots at so
much per bushel, was held not to be within the Statute of Frauds.
A contract to deliver to the defendant malt, which is to be manu-
factured by the plaintiff and to be paid for per quantity on de-
livery, was held not to be within the Statute of Frauds: Ferren
v. O'Hfara, 62 Barb. 527. Eight v. Ripley, 19 Me. 149, was ap-
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proved by MULLIN, J., who *delivered the opinion of the court, but
he felt constrained by the previous decisions in New York. Dono-
van v. Wilson, 26 Barb. 138, was said to be decisive of the case,
and the general principle was laid down that work bestowed upon
the subject of the contract so as to put it into the condition con-
templated by the contract, takes the case out of the Statute of
.Frauds. The reader is here reminded ,that there are two New
York case.s, Dowws v. Ross, 23 Wend. 270, and Seymour v. Davig,
2 Sandf. 239, which are in accord with the general course of
decision outside of that state.
In Passaic.-Afan. (o..v. Hoffman, 11 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 105,
however, C. J. DALY makes an elaborate and able review of the
cases and treats Downs v. Ross and Sewall v. Fitch, as substan-
tially overruled by Smith v.. B. B. Co., 4 Keyes 199.
Besides the abnormal authorities we have just been considering,
we have in Maryland Eichelberger v. .c auley, 5 Har. & J. 213,
holding a contract to thrash and deliver wheat not to be within the
Statute of Frauds, on the ground that work was necessary to the
delivery of the wheat, and Bentch v. Long, 28 Md. 188, to the same
effect. In, Gadsden v. Lance, 1 McMull. Eq. (South Car.) 90, it
was said "that when the goods contracted for exist in solido and are
capable of delivery at the time, it (the contract) "is within tb
statute, but where.they are to be made or something is to be done to
put them in' a condition to be delivered according to .the terms of the
contract, is not.within the statute." In Cummings v. Dennett, 26
Me. 401, Judge .WHITAN said: "It is very clear that if applica-
tion is made to a mechanic or manufacturer for articles in his line
of business, .and, he undertakes to prepare and finish them in a given
time, such a contract, thojngh not in writing, is not affected by the
stpatute: Mixer v. Howa th .a.nd Spencer v. Cane relied on, the
leazrnel judge evidentl, taking the same view of the former case
as the writer has done above.
A comparison of the American with the English rulings on tho
question which we have just been considering, will show on the part
of the latter a stricter adherence to the statute. Whether the
principles laid down by Judge SHAW and Judge BRONSON are not
more practical and sound, is a point which the reader must settle
for himself.
HENRY REED.
